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THE WESTERN PACIFIC
Perspective and Prospective

It is my understanding that at any given time up
to 75 ocean-going vessels can be counted in San Francisco Bay.
Within a 24-hour period, 50 planes on international schedule will
pass through the gateways of this city.

In a year, the Bay region

moves 13 million tons of cargo in and out of the nation.

Over

the same period, 400 to 500 thousand travelers enter or leave by
way of its portals .
These are figures which add to the cosmopolitan
luster of this magnificent city and I know they are a delight to
the Chamber.

They are also figures, may I say, which are not

calculated to grate on the ears of this distinguished group of
world traders.

..
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As a Senator of the United States, I share your
pleasure in an immense volume of international trade.

Since

Montana lacks ocean ports, moreover, it is quite agreeable that
a lion's share move through the waters which lie within the
jurisdiction of the sponsoring Chamber.

In view of the entrepot

which San Francisco provides for this great two-way flow, the
name

11

0ld Gold Mountain, 11 which is what I understand the Chinese

call the city, seems most appropriate.
There is great value in a thriving intercourse
with countries beyond our borders.

The exchange of goods and

peoples is a contribution to the nation's peace and well-being.
It is a source of enrichment of our national life.
In these times, however, any pleasure which comes
from international interchange is not unalloyed.

Rather, it is

tinged with a profound concern because Viet Nam figures in the
figure with which I opened my remarks.

You and I know that a

part of the 13 million tons of cargo is military

cargo; it is

headed for a brutal struggle in distant jungles and rice paddies.

- 3 You and I know that the travelers using the facilities of this
city are not all bent on commerce or pleasure.

The travelers

include tens of thousands of Americans outward bound for war or
homecoming from war, many bearing the scars of conflict and some
in the stillness of death.

The latest casualty figures show more

than 10,000 Americans killed and 55,000 wounded in Viet Nam.
So the satisfaction which comes from a flourishing international exchange, I repeat, is diluted by the implications of Viet Nam.

Viet Nam casts a shadow not only over your

commercial preoccupations; in the same way, it also dims other
aspects of our national life.

As Majority Leader of the Senate,

for example, I have had some association with the enactment of
the legislative programs of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

These programs, in my judgment, make exceptional con-

tributions to the nation's approach to the problems of older
citizens, public health, education, conservation of natural
resources, recreational facilities, taxation and economic
growth, international trade, transportation, communications,
'·.

- 4 power supply, and many other long-neglected public needs of the
American people.
Some of you may regard these programs in a different light.

However they may be judged, I can assure you that

from the point of view of a professional legislator, the enactment of the Kennedy and Johnson programs represents, in terms of
volume and scope, a unique legislative achievement.
The satisfaction which might be found in the
achievement, however, is dulled by the deepening concern with
Viet Nam.

And whatever contribution the enactment of the

Kennedy and Johnson programs may have made to the publ ic life
of the nation lies largely in the engulfing shadow of Viet Nam.
The Vietnamese conflict has something of the same
effect on the nation's foreign relations.

It throws into doubt,

for example, the fragile beginning in the improvement of relations
with the Eastern European nations.

It introduces a note of

diffidence into our associations with the Western Europeans who
are unwilling--to say the least--to immerse themselves in the
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question of Viet Nam.

It obscures the unfolding of events in

Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and even in other parts
of Asia which may have great significance for this nation.
That American interest should be concentrated on
Viet Nam is as inevitable as it is understandable.
tions of Viet Nam are stark and immediate.
war involves the young man next door.

The implica-

More and more the

Already it touches

directly a great number of American hearts.

It demands much

from many in the way of tangible personal sacrifice.

Millions

of Americans have been in Viet Nam or know someone who has been
in Viet Nam.

Millions more can expect to be exposed to a

similar experience.
Viet Nam is war and war takes precedence over
other affairs of the nation.

On that point there ought to be

no ground for confusion or doubt.

The support which the Americar

forces in Viet Nam have received has been unstinting.

They are

the best equipped and supplied military organization in the
history of warfare.

Whatever has been sought by the President

- 6 for the conduct of operations in Viet Nam has been granted
the Congress and by overwhelming votes.
by a resolution, which I myself happen to have introduced,
assuring to the men in Viet Nam the unequivocal support of the
nation.
That will continue to be the case for as long as
necessary.

Let neither friend nor foe be under any misapprehen

sian on that score.

Americans in Viet Nam shall receive what-

ever they may require to carry out their assignments.

They did

not choose to go to Viet Nam; they were sent there by the policies of the United States government.

To differ with the poli-

--

cies in no way inhibits a sense of obligation to the servicemen
in Viet Nam.

Nor, may I add, does full support of these men

require rote endorsement of the policies which sent them there.
To insist that the two are inseparable is to equate the open
heart of patriotism with the closed mind of political conformity .
President Johnson, may I say, was among the first
to reject any suggestion that the two are linked.

I know from

personal knowledge that he welcomes responsible discussion of

- 7 the question of Viet Nam and that he is prepared to listen to
all reasonable suggestions on how the conflict may be termina ed
in honor.
It must be faced frankly, however, that the end
is not in sight in Viet Nam.

It is not in sight, by military

action or negotiations, or any visible combination.

The question

of Viet Nam has taken on ever increasing significance to Americans as the massive buildup of forces in Southeast Asia has proceeded.

That buildup gives to the matter another dimension by

underscoring the depth of the commitment of the United States to
help the people of South Viet Nam preserve a choice over their
political future.
In view of the sacrifices which already have been
made, Viet Nam is now embedded in the feelings of the nation.
That is all the more reason for responsible public discussion of
the issues which are posed by this situation.

Unless it ensues,

the conflict in Viet Nam cannot be placed in accurate perspective
in terms of the domestic needs and other problems abroad which
confront the United States.

- 8 I would emphasize that Viet Nam is not the sum
of our national difficulties.

Notwithstanding Viet Nam, smog

will still settle over the cities of the nation.

There will be

no letup in the pollution of rivers, streams, and tidewaters.
Viet Nam will not spare us a long summer of racial and other
tension in the smoldering cities.

Viet Nam will not reduce the

pressure of population on the police, transport, educational,
housing, and other facilities of the great urban centers.

Wh~t

is required to maintain a prosperous and inflation-free economy
and a flourishing international exchange--as you well know-will not be lessened by Viet Nam.
Problems of this sort have been the preoccupation
of the Congress for the past several years.

I believe the

legislation which has been enacted goes to the heart of many of
them.

But this legal machinery must be used energetically and

it must be used wisely.

If it is neglected, if it grinds to a

halt because of the preoccupation with Viet Nam, the nation will
suffer the consequences in the years ahead.

A concentration on

- 9 Viet Nam may obscure the public needs of the nation but it will
not alleviate them.

On the contrary, Viet Nam will complicate

and exacerbate all of them.
In a similar vein, it should be noted that the
flow of events throughout the world will not wait upon a disposal
of the problem of Viet Nam.

There are questions of foreign re-

in
lations elsewherejwhich the stake of the nation is also very
great, but which tend to be overlooked in present circumstances.
One has only to note, for example, the current turn of developments in the Middle East.

We may well ask ourselves is the

change in that situation as sudden as it now appears?

Or did

the crisis gather while our preoccupations were elsewhere?
I would stress, therefore, that it is vital to
consider VietNam in the context of the nation's worldwide
interests.

In particular, we need to see this conflict in

Southeast Asia in the perspective of the nation's over-all
position in the Western Pacific.
Certain similarities between Korea and Viet Nam
are relevant to that perspective.

Both, for example, lie at
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extremities of an antagonistic mainland China and both are on
the Asian littoral of the Pacific Ocean.
colonial dependencies.

Both are former

Both were set free but were divided in

the wake of the collapse, respectively, of Japanese and French
power.
Our military involvements in the two conflicts
developed as a response to aggressive incursions from a
Communist-linked north into an American-linked south.

These

incursions were launched, however, not in the name of Communism
but under the banner of nationalism--of national liberation and
unity.
Both the conflict in Korea and in Viet Nam have
pitted us in brutal struggle against peoples for whom we have
had no tradition of hostility.

Both conflicts have exacted a

heavy toll of suffering and destruct ion amongst those people
and a large price in American lives and resources.

Our di rect

military involvement in each instance began as a limited effort,
on top of a prolonged period o f economic and military aid to a

- 11 -

weak indigenous government.

With U.N. sanction and support,

we sought to assist the South Koreans to repel an invasion from
North Korea.

This initial and successful campaign was then

pushed beyond its original purpose and led, against expectations,
into a massive and indecisive clash with mainland Chinese forces.
In Viet Nam we have had the support of certain
allied Asian and other Western Pacific nations but, to date,
the United Nations has maintained a formal silence.
sanctioned the U.S. action.

It has not

Indeed, the U.N. has not yet even

taken formal note of the existence of the conflict.

That is,

may I say, an immense understatement of a massive oversight.
If I may digress for a moment, I would express
the hope that steps will be taken to bring the U.N. into this
question in the

nea~

future.

At the very least, the U.N.

Security Council should recognize the existence of the struggle
and seek to bring all the disputants into a cards-on-the-table
confrontation.
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As in Korea, our military involvement in Viet
Nam began as a limited support undertaking.

By air and sea,

however, the military effort has now been expanded into North
Viet Nam .

At the same time, the war in the south has become ,

increasingly, an American military operation which pits our
forces against both North Vietnamese regulars and Viet Cong
gue rrillas.
The expansion of this conflict in Viet Nam, in
my judgment, carries the strong possibilities of another massive
clash between China and the United States and even the seeds of
World War III.

It is not that all concerned do not remember

the Korean experience.

It is not that this nation would deli-

berately enlar ge the Vietnamese conflict into a provocative
challenge to China.

It is simply that military actions once \

launched tend to establish their own momentum in which one
step leads inexorably to the next.

We may well ask ourselves

before we go much further in this process how many steps have
already been taken in this fashion since the first American
bomb fell on North Viet Nam scarcely three years ago?

- 13 The successive steps have drawn U.S. military
power deeply into Viet Nam.

.In this involvement, as with the

Korean conflict a decade and a half ago, we have made an immense
military commitment in a region in which our national interests
were minimal before World War II.

A quarter of a century ago,

Viet Nam and Korea scarcely piqued our national curiosity.
American foreign policy found little of relevance
to our national security and welfare in Korea.

The same was

true of Viet Nam or, for that matter, of Indo-China as a whole,
except perhaps as that region came under the control of the
Japanese war machine after 1940.

Pre-World War II trade with

these two Asian peninsulas was almost non-existent.

Americans

did not travel to either of them in any great numbers.

In

fact, in 1953, when I visited Laos with an associate, the two
~of us doubled the American population there.

Even at

date, there were only two young American vice-consuls living
in the entire country.

And in Viet Nam, that year, the total

of Americans certainly did not exceed two hundred, almost all

- 14 government officials and including several in an American
consular establishment in Hanoi.
The contrast, today, is staggering.

We have

mobilized in and around Viet Nam in Southeast Asia an American
military force in excess of half-a-million men.

We have thrown

into this conflict an enormous quantity and assortment of military materiel.
the struggle.

We have consigned great air and naval power to
Expenditures for military operations in Viet

Nam have now reached an annual rate which is estimated at $25
billion and is still rising.
As I have noted, this great commitment has been
undertaken in a region which, a few years ago, was scarcely
visible on the spectrum of the nation's interests in the
Western Pacific and of even less significance in terms of the
world-wide position of the United States.

The precipitous

increase to the present level of concern with Viet Nam raises
certain fundamental questions.

We must ask ourselves whether

the Vietnamese involvement (and, for that matter, the Korean

- 15 involvement) signifies a new concept of American interests
the Western Pacific?

n

Do these incursions into the Asian rna n-

land signal a permanent recasting of our policies?
Before trying to answer these questions, let me
refer briefly to the pattern of American policy in the Far
Pacific prior to World War II.

To put it succinctly, U.S.

policy traditionally resisted the committnent of substantial
American military power anywhere on Asian soil and, particularly,
anywhere much beyond the reach of naval support and supply.
Even during World War II, the nunmer of Americans who fought on
the Asian mainland was but a fraction of the forces which we
have at the present time in Viet Nam.
In setting the Philippines free in 1946,
this nation turned its back on a colonial role in Asia.

moreover~

To put

it another way, we rejected once and for all a dominant responsibility for the affairs or future of any Asian people.

Rather

than chase the illusions of imperialism, this nation saw its
interests in the Far East as lying precisely in the activities

- 16 which many in this group pursue for a living.

We saw those

interests in commercial and other exchange with an Asia of
peaceful, independent and developing nations.

To that end,

we were prepared to join with others in a judicious transfer
of the skills, knowledge and capital of modernization.
In my judgment, the present involvement in Viet
Nam in no way, shape, or form signals a substantial recasting
of our position in the Far East.

The Vietnamese conflict, as

the Korean conflict before it, is a consequence of the collapse
of Japanese and French imperial power.

It is a consequence of

the understandable weakness of the successor states.

Above all

else, it is a consequence of the Chinese revolutionary sweep
of the mainland and the ideological fears and other uncertainties whi ch were engendered by this cataclysmic change.
However, neither the involvement in Viet Nam nor
in Korea, I would reiterate, reflects a permanent change in our
position.

The role of American power on the Asian mainland was

and will one day, again, be limited.

We did not shake loose of

- 17 the costly responsibilities in the Philippines only to assume
them in Viet Nam by a new name.

Our extraordinary military

incursion into the Asian mainland will end as soon as the
extraordinary circumstances which have evoked it have also ended.
In the second half of the 20th century, this
nation is a world power, not a colonial power.

The global

scope of our current interests requires us to exercise the
responsibilities of the former even as it compels us to reject
the trappings of the latter.

In a similar vein, I would suggest

to you that the United States occupies the position of Pacific
power, not that of Asian power.

The difference is more than

semantic.
Every significant development in, on, and over
the Pacific Ocean has direct relevance to the security and wel being of the United States and we have a substantial capacity
to exercise a rational influence over the course of these developments.

We do not live, however, on the mainland of Asia

- 18 and the practical reach of our influence in the Far Pacific
does not extend very far inland from littorals.

We do not

have a unique or unilateral interest in what transpires on
theAsianmainland.

To the extent that we have an interest at

all, it is an interest which is shared with other nations, in
the peace, stability, and progress of one of the great regions
of the world.
In this context, our involvement in Viet Nam
will be seen to be a temporary phenomenon.
has made this point over and ove r again.

Indeed, the President
He has emphasized that

we shall not pursue the course of a bankrupt and bankrupting
colonialism in Asia.

He has emphasized that as soon as an

honorable settlement can be negotiated we will reverse the
extraordinary deployment of our military power into Southeast
Asia.

He has said time after time that we seek neither territory

nor permanent bases in that region.
Once peace is restored in Viet Nam, there could
emerge the conditions which will allow us to resume fully the
pursuit of our traditional interests in the Western Pacific.

- 19 In particular, it is to be anticipated that the prime international events of the Western Pacific will once again revolve
around the triad of Japan, the Soviet Union, and China.

Indeed,

there are signs that this restoration is already underway.
I would note, for example, that the clash of
historic border claims and other differences between China and
the Soviet Union has shattered the abnormal monolithic pattern
of relations between these two nations.

Yet only a few years

ago it was commonly thought that through Communism, Russia
could fasten a permanent yoke on China.

Indeed, we find,

that there is not even a common Communist ideology wi thin Chi

ra)L ~

,. ":"'-~ !

much less one which binds the Chinese in inseparable subser--

~~

vience to the Russians.

~

).. .y

To be sure, a mutual interest inthe conflict in ,.
Viet Nam has restrained differences to some degree between
Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic and additional
extensions of the war, moreover, could act to strengthen the
bridge between them.

If, as, and when the Vietnamese conflict
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is settled, however , the normal difficulties between China and
Russia may be expected once again to come into full play.
Japan's relations with mainland China have also
developed from the total alienation two decades ago in the
direction of a reassertion of natural cultural and economic
affinities.

It might be noted, for example, that mainland

China's trade with Japan now surpasses that of Taiwan.

The

total reached $600 million in 1966, almost evenly divided
between exports and imports.

In that year, China also became

Japan's fourth largest trading partner.
Similar tendencies towards normalization are to
be found in relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

Under

a five-year trade agreement which was initiated in 1965, total
trade between the two nations will approach half-a-bill i on
dollars for the year 1967, a large increase over last year.
There is als o under discuss i on at high levels in the Japanese
and Soviet governments plans for the joint development of Siberia
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These involve the exploitation of gas resources on Sovi et
Sakhalin, the building of an immense pipeline in Siberia, and,
possibly, the exploitation of Soviet timber and copper resources.
International developments of this kind, as I
noted at the outset of my remarks, tend to be overlooked in
our concern with Viet Nam.
them,

particularl~r

Yet, we cannot afford to ignore

when they may indicate changing situations

which are of great significance to our nat i onal interests .
In my judgment, the re-emergence of a free interplay among Japan, China, and the Soviet Union is a welcome
development.

It tends to restore the normal core of rela tions

in the Western Pacific.

It tends also to bring c loser the day

when this nation may rechannel its energ ies fully into the
pursuit of our traditional interests in that region.

Pre s ident

Johnson, in fact, has already begun to put emphasis on these
interests.

He has been, for example, a prime mover in taking

the multi-nation Mekong River Development Project from the
draft i n g boards where it had rested for many yea rs t o the
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construction sites of Southeast Asia.

He has given strong but

appropriate U. S. support to the creation of the Asian Development Bank.

He has pledged our contribution to the enormous tasks

of reconstruction and development in all of Southeast Asia which
must surely follow the conflict in Viet Nam.

In these and other

ways, he has made it abundantly clear that what we seek are the
lasting achievements of peace and nocthe fleeting triumphs of
war.
Peace in Viet Nam will pave the way for a reduction and return of our military forces from the Southeast Asian
peninsula.

One would hope

that it might also pave the

way for a reduction and return of our forces from the Korean
peninsula.

These pull-backs of American power, of course, can-

not and will not occur in a vacuum.

As a prerequisite, they

will require satisfactory political settlements of the problems
of the Korean partition and the Vietnamese division.

They will

require assurances of stability in the Formosan Straits which,
in effect, would involve a settlement of the questions of the

- 23 Chinese partition.

They will require the establishment of

effective international guarantees of the peace and security
of nations both large and small throughout Eastern and Southeast
Asia.

In short, they will require the liquidation of the prob-

lems left over from World War II and the Chinese Revolution.
I do not know when all involved w1.ll be prepared
for the face-to-face negotiations which are necessary to restore
and maintain a durable peace in the Western Pacific.

I do know

that the sooner there can be a rendezvous with realities in
on the part of all involved, the better for this nation, for th
Asian nations and for the world.

